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The paper discusses one of the major principles of critical rationalism with a critical 
approach. This principle is about giving all participants the opportunity to argue in a 
friendly spirit. I analyze the main theoretical and practical implications of this maxim 
and argue for the importance of this Popperian principle beyond scientific rationality, 
enabling a general rationality for co-operation among all interested parties in the argu-
mentation of scientific or everyday life issues, no matter if they are our friends or oppo-
nents. The conclusion is that this maxim has an inner logic with an effective result of 
successful dialectic argumentation and critical thinking. A parallel has been drawn be-
tween Christian love for others, the Socratic insight that it is better to suffer injustice 
than to do it and the strategy of Popper’s principle. And hereby I suggest its compatibil-
ity with Popper’s so-called via negativa. 
Keywords: Popper, Fallibility, Argumentation, Critical Rationalism, Dialectic. 
 
Eleştirel Rasyonalizmin Diyalektik Maksimi Üzerine 
Öz 
Bu makale, eleştirel rasyonalizmin temel ilkelerinden birini eleştirel olarak tartışmakta-
dır. Bu ilke, bütün taraflara barışsal bir ruhla tartışma fırsatını vermekle ilgilidir. Yaptı-
ğımız çalışmada, bu maksimin temel kuramsal ve pratik etkilerini analiz edip, Karl Pop-
per’in prensibinin bilimsel rasyonalitenin ötesinde olan öneminden bahsedilmektedir. 
Böylece, ister bilimsel isterse de gündelik yaşam konularının tartışılmasında, tüm ilgili 
taraflar -ister arkadaşlarımız ister rakiplerimiz olsun- arasındaki iş birliğine genel bir 
rasyonellik kazandırılacaktır. Sonuç olarak, burada sunulan maksima, bir iç mantığa 
sahip olan başarılı bir diyalektik tartışmaya ve eleştirel düşünceye doğru götürmektedir. 
Hıristiyanlığın diğerlerine karşı sevgisi, Sokrates düşüncesinde yer alan ‘adaletsiz ol-
maktansa adaletsizlikten muzdarip olmanın daha iyi olduğu’ inancı ve Popper’ın ilkesi-
nin stratejisinin birbirine paralel olduğunu görürüz. Bu şekilde, ben Popper’ın sözde via 
negativa ile uyumunu öneriyorum. 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Popper, Yanıltıcı, Argümantasyon, Eleştirel Rasyonalizm, Diyalek-
tik. 
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INTRODUCTION  
In rational life, we are obliged to argue for our beliefs, viewpoints, 
actions, and ground them, because our human nature as rational beings 
entails that it better not to have ungrounded convictions and beliefs, 
views or even actions. The same holds for science, where scientific ra-
tionality requires that every claim has to have a foundation, whether 
empirical or a priori or mixed one. 
It happens that people act contrary to the requirements of our ra-
tionality, but, in such cases, we call those actions irrational and un-
grounded actions. We ascribe the same attribute to people who “argue” 
incorrectly, by saying, for example, that: “1. If it is raining (short: A), 
(then) the street will be wet (B) and it is the case that it is raining (A). It 
follows that the street isn’t wet (not B)”, which can be formalized as fol-
lows: 
If A, then B 
A is true 
 
B isn’t true 
But it is a matter of fact that in presenting arguments of this form, 
we can evaluate those arguments in an objective way by applying rules 
of logic, without being forced to argue for or against the validity of such 
arguments. Still, when it comes to evaluating arguments, which don’t 
only have a clear schematic structure, but also a content, which needs to 
be interpreted and evaluated, nobody has a clear decision procedure to 
resolve the issue without interpretation. The interpretation itself, how-
ever, needs a debate, as a matter of practical nature, which requires 
some standard for proceeding. It is not easy to set this standard, to de-
cide which criterion to use, in order to respect all participants in the 
discussion. Even the invitation to get the other to participate in the dis-
cussion is sometimes very difficult. Therefore, it is important to propose 
ways to satisfy the need for rational debate or discussion. In this sense, 
Popper proposed a magical maxim for critical debate, which is inclusive 
for all participants, leaving a place for rationality in a wide sense, and 
seeking coexistence recognition of participants. I call this maxim magic 
because of its magical effects of functioning, despite the contra-intuitive 
thinking that it contradicts the rational way of thinking. In the next part, 
I will analyze Popper’s maxim of critical rationalism, which is, as I argue, 
a rational principle of co-operation for all arguers in a discussion  
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1. ARGUING RATIONALLY IN SCIENCE 
To argue rationally means to give reasons and to follow logical rules 
of argumentation. Reasons in argumentation are usually given in such a 
way that one starts from one or more judgments we call premises, and 
upon them, we infer base the entailed judgment called the conclusion. In 
everyday life, the conclusion represents our beliefs, our views or even 
our actions. This means, that if we have any belief, this belief should be 
held because we have necessarily some ground (premises) to believe it. 
This holds for all cases, in deductive and inductive arguments as well as 
in those cases where we are forced to believe something by force of rea-
son like analytic truths or observation e. g. in case I see something in 
front of me, or that I am in danger of something which I fear, etc.1  
Thus, the standard manner of our argumentation is to proceed up-
on grounds. If we want to have valid arguments, then starting from as-
sumed true premises should yield that the conclusion will necessarily 
also be true. In other words, in a valid argument A, it is impossible for 
the argument A to have true premises, but a false conclusion.2 This ap-
plies to the validity of an argument and to rational procedure in general. 
On the other hand, the soundness of convincing arguments requires that 
the premise and the conclusion should be necessarily factual truths 
based on evidence (facts, data, laws, definitions etc.). True, the evidence 
may be either analytical or empirical or both. But the question here is 
how do we present the possible evidence for our arguments? In scien-
tific reasoning, one presents the evidence showing that it is true. But in 
science one presents the evidence respecting rules of deductive or in-
ductive reasoning, whereby the rules of deductive reasoning dominate. 
In this paper, I won’t go into the rules of reasoning found in most logic 
textbooks. But, it is important to emphasize that no science is possible 
unless all logical laws are respected. But this is not so simple in every-
day life.  
2. GIVING REASONS IN EVERYDAY LIFE AND DOGMATISM 
In everyday life, our arguments proceed in most cases by the usual 
procedure of deductive, inductive or analogical argumentation. On the 
other hand, in the discussion of giving reasons in everyday life, one con-
troversial issue has been whether our arguments are influenced by the 
                                                             
1  Cf. The thesis of emotion-based reasoning in Peter de Jong and Maartje Vroling, “Better Safe 
than Sorry: Threat-Confirming Reasoning bias in Anxiety Disorders”, Emotion and Reaso-
ning (London: Psychology Press, 2014), 22-43. 
2  Cf. Volker Halbach, The Logic Manual (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 19. 
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“heart”-judgments or by the emotions.3 It seems that emotions are the 
starting point for some judgments, which one considers to be the most 
trustful judgments, and  which move us to act.4 My own view is that 
when we do things solely as our heart feels or judges, we do them for 
many reasons, which in turn are dependent on our perspectives, inter-
ests, preferences, and beliefs. It seems that our education has an im-
portant role for believing something to be true, and in most cases our 
beliefs rely on the preferences and perspectives we take in a certain 
situation, depending on our personal history and how we have learned 
to do something or to draw conclusions. However, this does not repre-
sent any a priori dogmatism during the process of gaining those beliefs 
from the heart’s perspective. Yet we also intervene on logical grounds in 
taking positions on some issues. Nevertheless, our decisions to take 
some actions are influenced directly by the heart-judgments, and as is 
well known, the heart ultimately has a “logic”, which kills every rational 
reason or ground. This means also that we tend to take some of our po-
sitions without being open to revise them, because of our insistence on 
our history of or success with our positions. This leads to take some po-
sitions and believe them fundamentally, insofar one holds them to be 
true, and by assuming it is impossible for them to be false. This contra-
dicts the other position in the discussion, if we assume that in a discus-
sion there are at least two disputants. 
The issue is that once we have gained a belief, etc. in practice, we do 
not provide reasons for it, but we take it and believe it to be true, and act 
on it, because we want to avoid an endless pursuit of reasons for our 
beliefs, and this would lead us, on the other hand, to one of the 
Münchhausen trilemmas, when someone wants to get himself out of clay 
by seizing his own hair. After all, it is impossible to justify every reason, 
                                                             
3  Cf. Robert C. Solomon, “Logic of Emotion”, Noûs 11/1 (1977): 41-49, here 45, when he says 
that “emotions are judgments” – although he admits correctly that this is an “oversimpli-
fied” position. Although I agree with Solomon up to a point, I cannot accept his overall 
conclusion that emotions and judgments can be fully identified, because of their spontane-
ity, nevertheless, it is a defensible standpoint, because they are a kind of judgment. 
4  David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960), 96, defines 
belief as “An opinion, therefore, or belief may be most accurately defin’d, A LIVELY IDEA 
RELATED TO OR ASSOCIATED WITH A PRESENT IMPRESSION”, [All capitals in original], 
whereas in David Hume, An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, ed. Peter Millican 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 48, the following definition is found: “I say then, 
that belief is nothing but a more vivid, lively, forcible, firm, steady conception of an object, 
than what the imagination alone is ever able to attain”. – It seems that these two Hume’s 
definitions clarify what we bring with when we put forward premises, and in particular in 
situations when we argue with the rationality of the “heart”, which practically changes 
things with the force of belief (opinion or conviction) that is capable of bringing forth the 
actions.  
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because it would lead us into an argumentum ad infinitum or would re-
quire begging the question, which doesn’t lead anywhere. Sometimes 
moreover, there is no good reason why, because the “reasons” are emo-
tional, based on an interest in survival, etc. 
Starting from this fact, certain dogmatism arises, which leads one to 
believe one’s view is the only right one, what’s more, that only one’s 
own standpoint is the right view, and that all other views are not well-
founded. As a consequence, this leads to a closed mind. This dogmatism 
necessarily leads to mistakes stemming from the impossibility of coming 
out of them with the dogmatic implicit manner. The dogmatic way of 
thinking doesn’t allow getting free from the dogma; as a consequence 
dogma produces dogma, which all together can bring a deadlock. Alt-
hough those dogmas may eventually present a system of coherent per-
suasions, they are at the minimum creative to take into account alterna-
tives, which may even offer some other option to solve a particular is-
sue, no matter, practical or mental. 
3. KARL POPPER’S RESPONSE TO DOGMATISM 
To get free of this dogmatic way of thinking, the renowned Austrian 
philosopher Karl R. Popper (1902-1994) has proposed a principle. Even 
though it does not provide an immediate liberation from dogmas, it cer-
tainly creates the main premises and conditions for the salvation from 
those dogmas. This is the principle of critical rationalism, which Popper 
presents in his book The Open Society and its Enemies (1945). In this 
book, Popper formulates his dialectical maxim of debate and says: “I 
may be wrong and you may be right, and by an effort, we may get nearer 
to the truth”.5 (Italics in original) This principle of Popper is derived 
from a context of definition that Karl Popper gives for critical rational-
ism, where he says “[...] we could then say that rationalism is an attitude 
of readiness to listen to critical arguments and to learn from experience. 
It is fundamentally an attitude of admitting that ‘I may be wrong and you 
may be right, and by an effort, we may get nearer to the truth’”.6  
From the first step, this constitutes a salvation from dogmatic rigid-
ity and well-formed strategic and tactical guidance for the dialectic of 
argumentation, enabling the other side or party to enter into conversa-
tion or dialogue to weigh the arguments critically, and not to insist dog-
matically on their own arguments. 
                                                             
5  Karl Popper, Open Society and Its Enemies (London: Routledge, 1947), 2: 213. 
6  Popper, Open Society and Its Enemies, 2: 213. 
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What is practically obvious in this principle is the fact that (i) here 
are two persons arguing either of whom may be right or wrong and (ii) 
the two arguers are oriented towards the truth, which can be reached by 
giving the chance to be right to each other. The main purpose, then, is to 
approach to the truth. But the strategic path leading closer to the truth 
depends on allowing self-criticism to take place. This self-criticism is 
strategically the starting point for all parties involved in searching for 
the truth, assuming that everybody’s arguments can be wrong. This is the 
best strategy of argumentation and critical thinking for many reasons. 
Let’s suppose, on the one hand, that we are starting from a dogmat-
ic point of view trying to claim the truth for ourselves and not allowing 
to let it go, leaving no chance for the other to be right and for ourselves 
to be wrong. In this case, the truth is intended by each side from its own 
point of view. It may be likely that one side possesses the truth, but the 
other side contradicts it firmly and does not let it move forward towards 
the truth. The reason is that each party involved departs from the dog-
matic strategic premise that she or he is right and the other is always 
wrong, thus creating an impassable barrier. 
Let assume, on the other hand, that we set things moving from the 
Popperian point of view assuming that approaching the truth is the ul-
timate goal, but that the method is a non-dogmatic one, moved by the 
dynamics of letting go and giving “right of way” to others in the manner 
that the position A gives priority to the position B, and vice versa, re-
flecting that position A may be wrong and position B be right, and vice 
versa. We see here a principle that should practically hold for both posi-
tions, which means that both positions have the same starting point of a 
giving-up of one’s own insistence to be the only one who is right in arguing 
with the same goal, namely an open cooperation with the other side 
without dogmatic persistence in the arguments which may be wrong in 
themselves. So, the decisive factor is that the critical rationalism proce-
dure lies in attempting to bring both, the positions and the alternatives, 
together nearer to the truth by allowing for the possibility that the other 
side is right. If the two positions were statically insisting on their own 
positions, then it would be impossible to reach an initial agreement for 
trying to move towards the truth. On the contrary, each position would 
immobilize and stick in its claims.  
The Popperian view seems to be a dialectical self-sacrifice, but it is 
completely rational and analytic, which only insists strategically on two 
operational prerequisites of argumentation: (i) the fallibility of each 
position, hence the possibility that each position may be wrong, and (ii) 
the request to strive to come nearer to the truth together for its own 
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sake. From this Popperian point of view, no one possesses the truth a 
priori, but two positions can search together for the truth in their efforts 
to recognize the external or internal reality, thus the truth as the whole. 
The demand of critical rationalism, namely, for self-sacrifice, doesn’t 
hold only for the weakest side: self-sacrifice holds for all affected or in-
volved in argumentation, without exception. 
4. JOINT EFFORTS OF ORGANIZED SCEPTICS FOR CO-
OPERATION AS A LIFESTYLE 
Now, what does the joint effort to move towards the truth look like 
and what lessons could we draw from the Popperian maxim? 
This effort consists of the initial request for letting go to both argu-
ers’ respective positions to evaluate and critically test the arguments 
together and thus to analyzing and justifying the premises that lead to 
the particular conclusions they trust and believe and consequently, to 
see which view or argument brings them us closer to the truth. This 
implies naturally which viewpoint brings us more benefits in the given 
field, which includes fewer errors for the present and the future, which 
is more descriptive, explanatory and predictive. This should be practi-
cally and theoretically supported by experts in the given field. 
Clearly, Popper here sets out the boundaries of reason and hopes 
that this principle casts more light for a clearer view than a dogmatist 
principle that claims no need for more light due to the “reason” one 
owns and/or quasi-possesses. This is, of course, a clear indication which 
enables us to understand that Popper here gives a strategic role to ra-
tional argumentation, and thus does not narrow the rationality at all. 
Indeed, here we are dealing with a wider notion of rationality than 
scientific rationality, and this kind of rationality is in fact what W. H. 
Newton-Smith calls epistemic rationality.7 This epistemic rationality is 
wider, because it does not imply what is self-evident and standard in 
science, namely criticism, but gives a definition beyond this, a general 
notion of rationality that includes both deductive and inductive argu-
ments, but also non-scientific ones. This holds because of the very fact 
that this maxim gives a priori an equal opportunity for all interested 
parties to argue their arguments with a high degree of conscientious-
ness for the sole purpose of seeking to come closer to the truth in every 
field of life. This kind of open opportunity for all rational people who 
                                                             
7  Cf. William Herbert Newton-Smith, “Popper, Science and Rationality”, Karl Popper: Philo-
sophy and Problems, ed. Anthony O’Hear (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 
21ff. 
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want to argue critically provides an option for fulfilling what E. T. Damer 
calls the ethical standard of argumentation,8 that all of us, friends and 
enemies cooperating among ourselves,9 should have in a just and fair 
way and so remain within what is called the “rules of the game”10 in 
rational communication with arguments for finding the truth. This truth 
has to be sought with patience in all spheres of life because it is not re-
vealed, but it must be found, and which is likely to never be found in its 
totality, but only in the parts as in a mosaic. 
Assuming the participants’ fallibility in argumentation makes it 
possible to create a preliminary framework for a balanced agreement in 
rational argumentation, in order to approach the truth in a rational-
critical way through the institution that Robert K. Merton calls an orga-
nized scepticism11 of cooperating scientists, but it is not reduced only to 
this organization. Co-operation in this context determines that two argu-
ers start from the same position of fallibility, not by defending them-
selves, but by giving to the other, constructively, an advantage to enter 
the game, which at the end of the day gives its rational results. Thus this 
principle is a principle directed towards the other, which I may call a 
principle of equal altruism in the dialectic of argumentation. 
Moreover, this constructive method of argumentation also offers an 
opportunity for the other to revise own arguments. This does not hap-
pen in normal rational arguments, because arguments are only present-
ed there, with no initial suggestion or starting point for error. Construc-
tive Popperian argumentation does the opposite, giving the other ad-
vantage by assuming the opportunity for the other to be right in his ar-
guments, but also giving him the opportunity to change his mind. This, 
so to speak, constitutes a formula or a magical imperative for construc-
tive and cooperative peaceful argumentation, anticipating, first of all, 
not the error of the opponent’s arguments, but one’s own wrongfulness. 
In addition to the strategic nature of the invitation for a sincere ar-
gumentation and dialogue, this Popperian method of argumentation 
represents a living attitude,12 a way of life, and is a formulation for an 
                                                             
8  Cf. T. Edward Damer, Attacking the Faulty Reasoning: A Practical Guide to Fallacy-Free 
Arguments (Belmont: Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2009), 6. 
9  Newton-Smith, “Popper, Science and Rationality”, 23. 
10  Cf. Damer, Attacking the Faulty Reasoning, 6. 
11 Cf. Robert King Merton, “Priorities in Scientific Discovery”, The Sociology of Science: Theo-
retical and Empirical Investigations, ed. Norman W. Storer (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1973), 303.  
12 Cf. Noretta Koertge, “The Moral Underpinnings of Popper’s Philosophy”, Rethinking Popper, 
ed. Zuzana Parusnikova and Robert S. Cohen (Boston: Springer Science, 2009), 325. 
42 | KRİSTË SHTUFİ 
Mütefekkir 5/9 (Haziran 2018): 33-46 
action line in rational discussion in each field.13 Of course, this may seem 
at first glance damaging to the scientific requirement for direct evi-
dence. But if viewed more closely, it actually achieves this purpose, only 
giving the motive for the openness of the proofs, with little effort and 
without any psychological barriers, of course taking on the burden of 
possibly making mistakes, which shows also the character of critical 
rationalism being a rational way of life. 
Even in critical rationalism, and especially in this Popperian theory, 
arguments and ideas must be tested for them to be logically and empiri-
cally unflawed, but this does not diminish the demand for a strategically 
magical formula for an open discussion, and consequently successful 
and effective, thus surpassing all the positions that can lead to an a pri-
ori dogmatism. The ability to hear the other, without prejudice and the a 
priori hope that the other will be right, − against the dogmatic hope that 
the other will be wrong and I am right − brings with it the fruits of mu-
tual cooperation, which is approaching the truth for one aspect of reali-
ty. As Van Eemeren  Grootendorst emphasize, this openness to talk to 
the other includes two criteria: problem validity and intersubjective 
validity, which means “problem-solving effectiveness and their intersub-
jective acceptability”.14 
It is by no means surprising that when Kira G. Morse judges the pos-
itive practice of the Popperian maxim in such a way that “[...] based on 
this principle, debate clubs flourish in high schools all over the United 
States and abroad”,15 because this dialectical principle is an appeal 
against dictatorship and calls for a liberating and relieving rational de-
bate between adult and rational people in all areas of life, whether in 
science, politics or in everyday life. 
5. POPPER’S MAXIM AS A QUASI-RELIGIOUS AND/OR SOCRATIC 
MORAL GUIDELINE FOR ARGUMENTATION AND ITS COMPATI-
BILITY WITH HIS VIA NEGATIVA 
Popper’s maxim for argumentation has a quasi-religious feel. One of 
the most celebrated maxims in Christian history is Jesus Christ’s maxim 
of love for enemies, where Jesus says: “But I say to you, Love your ene-
mies and pray for those who persecute you, so that you may be children 
of your Father in heaven;” (Mt, 5: 44-45, New Revisited Standard Ver-
                                                             
13 Cf. Joseph Agassi - Ian Jarvie, A Critical Rationalist Aesthetics (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2008), 2. 
14 Frans H. Van Eemeren - Rob Grootendorst,  A Systematic Theory of Argumentation: The 
Pragma-Dialectical Approach (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 132. 
15 Kira G. Morse, “Debate: A Tool for Language Learning”, Journal of Border Educational Rese-
arch 10  (2011): 108-119, here 108. 
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sion). It seems to me that Popper’s maxim has a similar design to Jesus’ 
commandment against violence and his call to love our enemies. The 
love for enemies is a paradoxical deed in action. In argumentation in-
deed, we actually don’t have to do with enemies, but with opponents. 
Yet, the most striking point in Popper’s viewpoint is that we should give 
an advantage to the opponent, which means that everyone has to sacri-
fice himself in letting the other be the first, for the sake of coming closer 
together to the truth, just like in Christ’ commandment one can find the 
final end “to be sons of Father in heaven”.  It is true that the direct paral-
lel of Jesus’s commandment and Popper’s maxim can’t be drawn, with-
out being simplistic. In his book Open Society and its Enemies, Popper 
maintains that: 
“I admit that the emotions of love and compassion may sometimes lead 
to a similar effort. But I hold that it is humanly impossible for us to 
love, or to suffer with, a great number of people; nor does it appear to 
me very desirable that we should, since it would ultimately destroy ei-
ther our ability to help or the intensity of these very emotions. But rea-
son, supported by imagination, enables us to understand that men who 
are far away, whom we shall never see, are like ourselves, and that 
their relations to one another are like our relations to those we love. A 
direct emotional attitude towards the abstract whole of mankind 
seems to me hardly possible, We can love mankind only in certain con-
crete individuals.”16  
Popper’s point in this text is that one cannot love all mankind, but 
only some individuals. Nevertheless, in this relation, analogous to Chris-
tian love for one’s enemies, one can give only to the other, to the indi-
vidual in argumentation, in a concrete situation and step by step, the 
favor and the supremacy of being right, and this means in Christian ter-
minology to “love thy enemies”. Naturally, it cannot be given the right to 
all the arguments in the world, but it is for sure that it can be given to 
the concrete arguer, which is an ideal of what I called the altruism in 
argumentation. Everyone who loves his enemies is being self-sacrificed 
at any rate. Equally, everyone who is giving the advantage to the oppo-
nent, and is at the beginning assuming the possibility of being wrong in 
one’s own arguments, is being willingly self-sacrificed, until the truth is 
confirmed in testing the arguments. But the confirmation of truth 
doesn’t belong to our discussion because this is a further another step. 
In this sense, a parallel can be drawn, at least partially, that both strate-
gies are played with self-sacrifice for the sake of a higher splendid and 
sublime purpose. 
                                                             
16 Popper, Open Society and Its Enemies, 2: 226. 
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The rationality of presuming that the other is right is a theoretical 
hypothesis that we can be also in the position of being right from the 
other side. That means that we are actually paradoxically egoistic in our 
altruism. But this is only a consequence, not the purpose of this strategy. 
The strategy of this maxim says that everybody is optimistic and posi-
tive thinking for the other side. That is, “the critical rationalist attitude 
that Popper advocated […] is an indispensable ingredient of the life that 
an open society offers.”17 
Another analogy for the Popperian moral credo can be made in the 
light direction of the Socratic insight, where Socrates in Platos Gorgias 
474b says: “For I do believe that you and I and everybody else consider 
doing what’s unjust worse than suffering it”.18 This sentence of Socrates 
has been even cited by Popper himself in the Preface of the German edi-
tion of his Lectures Auf der Suche nach einer besseren Welt [Engl.=In the 
Search for a better World].19 
Popper’s maxim is compatible with his methodology of via negativa, 
“which says that we learn by correcting our errors, from refutation of 
our conjectures, from touching and bumping into the real; in any case 
not from confirmations, since they can be spurious, and they often 
are.”20 Correcting our errors is a way of learning and it should begin 
with correcting in the first place our views, and the best way to proceed 
correcting our views in a discussion or dialogue with others according 
to Popper seems to be by systematically assuming the fallibility of our 
errors, and not beginning with the suspecting starting point to review 
arguments of the others, by assuming they are wrong. This holds sys-
tematically for everyone. This point of view should be itself not a dogma, 
but a strategic invitation for a practice of reforming own views by exam-
ining them on the hypothetical assumption they are wrong. This is also 
compatible with the reductio ad absurdum method, assuming that our 
arguments are wrong. 
CONCLUSION 
In this article I argued that Popper’s strategic credo for a prelimi-
nary agreement among the contestants for a zero starting point wherein 
                                                             
17 David Miller, “Popper and Tarski”, Popper’s Open Society After Fifty Years: The Continuing 
Relevance of Karl Popper, ed. Ian Jarvie (London: Routledge, 1999), 58. 
18 John M. Cooper, Plato: Complete Works (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997), 818. 
19 Karl Popper, Auf der Suche nach einer besseren Welt: Vorträge und Aufsätze aus dreißig 
Jahren (München: Piper, 1999), 11. 
20 Ian Jarvie, “Popper’s Philosophy and the Methodology of Social Science”, The Cambridge 
Companion to Popper, ed. Jeremy Shearmur and Gabriel Stokes (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2016), 292. 
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all involved are equally tolerant of the other side within the debate and 
where all display cooperative and self-sacrificing understanding, giving 
constantly priority to the other side in looking to come closer to the 
truth together, is a wise maxim of the dialectic of argumentation, and 
that this credo represents an invitation to rationality and does not 
weaken either science or everyday dialogue. On the contrary, all in-
volved can derive providentially very beneficial fruits from this dialecti-
cal strategy. I draw additionally a parallel between the Christian love for 
enemies and the strategy of the maxim of critical rationalism, but also 
with the Socratic insight of being in a better position to suffer the unjust, 
than to do so. Popper’s maxim of critical rationalism is compatible with 
Popper’s so called via negativa.21 
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